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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MANIPULATING DISCLOSURE: CREATIVE COMPLIANCE IN THE
ISRAELI FOOD INDUSTRY
SHARON YADIN*
ABSTRACT
Front-of-package food labels meant to inform consumers of the food’s
nutritional values through simple and easy-to-comprehend graphic rating and
warning systems are gaining increasing popularity in regulatory spheres.
Around the world, health regulators have adopted front-of-package disclosure
systems based on infographics, symbols, logos, colors, numbers, and letters, via
both mandatory and voluntary schemes, while others, such as the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”), are considering adopting them. The recent
Israeli food-labeling reform reveals consumer misinformation tactics deployed
by food companies through various graphic manipulations that can be regarded
as “creative compliance.” Adding to the policy and theory of disclosure
regulation, this Article discusses the misinformation effect of graphic disclosure
and suggests soft law tools for combating this regulatory failure, such as
regulatory shaming and voluntary regulatory agreements.

* Ph.D., Research Fellow, University of Haifa Faculty of Law, Israel. sharon@yadin.com. I would
like to thank the University of Haifa Faculty of Law for their support of this research and the Saint
Louis University Law Journal editorial team for their diligent work. The article was presented at
the 2021 Georgetown Law and the University of Sydney Global Food Governance Conference. I
thank the organizers and the participants for their helpful input.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments worldwide use information disclosure as a tool for regulating
pharmaceuticals, tobacco products, television and gaming content, finance and
banking, food, and retail. 1 Disclosure rules are designed to address informational
gaps between companies and stakeholders, such as consumers, viewers, users,
investors, and patients. 2 These rules require companies to disclose certain
information that can help the public make a more informed decision about
whether, how, when, where, and how much to use products and services. 3
Disclosure is often aimed at reducing public misinformation and increasing the
accessibility of accurate information regarding the risks, dangers, benefits,
effects, performance, probabilities, advantages, and value associated with
commodities. However, disclosure rules can also be manipulated by firms to
produce misleading and counterproductive effects.
This Article focuses on a specific type of disclosure rule manipulation
relating to recent regulatory endeavors to communicate simplified information
to the public through infographics, color schemes, and icons—for example, on
food labels. While technically complying with the regulation, firms use visual
“creative compliance” tactics, such as changing the color of packaging, to
increase consumer confusion and frustrate important regulatory goals. 4
The Article examines a recent Israeli Ministry of Health reform in which
food companies were required to mark relevant packages with predefined red
markings indicating high content of saturated fat, sugar, and salt. 5 Yet, while
companies generally complied with the letter of the law and added the required
markings, many have also added markings of their own, changed the background
color of labels and packages to red, and added red artwork next to the red
regulatory markings. 6
The case study of Israeli food labeling reveals a relatively underexplored
problem, in which companies use subconscious graphic manipulation tactics to
respond to newly mandated disclosure rules. Within this regulatory dynamic, a
regulatory mechanism that aims to improve public access to information through
easily understandable graphics is manipulated by firms, who instead spread
misinformation in a sophisticated manner. I will discuss this specific type of
regulatory failure as the misinformation effect of graphic disclosure.

1. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, TOO MUCH INFORMATION: UNDERSTANDING WHAT YOU
DON’T WANT TO KNOW 50 (2020).
2. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 9, 40 (2007).
3. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 3 (2014).
4. See infra Part II.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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This case study and its analysis may hold important implications for both
theory and policy regarding disclosure rules. On the theory side, the article also
contributes to creative compliance literature, consumer law and regulation
studies, and food law scholarship. On the policy side, it aims to provide valuable
insights for policymakers in various jurisdictions who are currently considering
graphics-based reforms, especially in the food industry, but also in other fields
of regulation.
The article is organized as follows: Part I presents the role and mechanism
of disclosure rules in regulatory settings, focusing especially on food labels.
Part II analyzes the recent Israeli food-labeling reform as a case study of industry
manipulation of disclosure rules and develops a theory on the misinformation
effect of graphic disclosure rules. Part III suggests possible avenues for
mitigating the problem of misinformation and creative compliance in disclosure
rules regimes, focusing on regulatory shaming of industry members and
regulatory compliance agreements with industry.
I. FOOD LABELS & DISCLOSURE RULES
A.

Food Labels & Principles of Disclosure Regulation

In our daily lives, we see disclosure regulation in action everywhere we
look: our cars are rated as to how safe and how polluting they are; our television
programs carry labels indicating which content is suitable for children; 7 and our
food is stamped with labels providing information on its nutritional value. The
main goal of disclosure rules is to reveal to the public more information, clearer
information, more accurate information, or more accessible information.
Disclosure regulation requires manufacturers, marketers, and service
providers to disclose information about their products and services to
stakeholders, such as consumers, clients, users, employees, patients, residents,
and investors. Regulatory rules of disclosure detail the ways and forms in which
such information is to be provided. 8 For example, various rules and regulations
specify the colors, sizes, location, and fonts of television markings, as well as
cigarette packages and food labels. 9 The ways in which information is presented
are considered crucial to effective disclosure regimes. 10
In the food industry, regulatory laws, regulations, and guidelines determine
which information should and should not appear on product packaging, as well
7. See, e.g., Tali Teeni Harari & Sharon Yadin, Regulatory Literacy: Rethinking Television
Rating in the New Media Age, 88 UMKC L. REV. 101 (2019).
8. See, e.g., BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
REGULATION 96 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Do Graphic Tobacco Warnings Violate the First Amendment?,
64 HASTINGS L. J. 1467 (2013).
10. See David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGM’T 161 (2006).
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as how it should (and should not) be presented. Nutritional values, ingredients,
expiration and manufacture dates, directions for use and storage, allergens and
additives, manufacturer details, and prices are usually required to be placed on
packaging according to specific rules.
While this is important consumer information, it is also a lot for consumers
to process. For example, nutritional panels tend to be difficult to comprehend,
time-consuming, and also hard to access because they are often located in the
back of packaging or under packaging folds. 11 It is therefore not surprising that
most consumers are interested in food labels that are easier to read. 12
Accordingly, substantial efforts are being made in countries all over the world
to simplify the information provided under disclosure schemes; for example, by
using symbols, icons, colors, prominent letters, and other graphical elements.
These markings, symbols, and icons are sometimes the product of private
initiatives, such as the “Smart Choice” and “Facts Up Front” labels in the United
States, 13 but they can also take the form of mandatory or voluntary government
schemes. Indeed, disclosure rules can be designed and enforced by industry
members, business unions, international institutions, nonprofit organizations,
consumer groups, governments, and administrative agencies. 14 This article
focuses on mandated rules, enacted and enforced by administrative agencies
responsible for regulating food products.
Regulatory agencies often use disclosure rules to provide people with a solid
factual basis for informed decision-making and to make them aware of any
harms inherent in a product or a service. Properly informed, target audiences can
then decide whether, how, when, where, and how much to use a commodity. In
the food industry, disclosure regulation protects consumers from food hazards,
such as eating expired foods, helps them make informed nutritional choices, for
example, regarding consumption of calories, fats, and sugars, and facilitates
cost–benefit decision-making, by providing information on price, quantity, and
quality of food products. Disclosure rules in the food industry can also combat
misinformation, such as the common notion that various breakfast cereals and

11. See Brendon Murphy & Jay Sanderson, Soft Law, Responsibility and the Biopolitics of
Front-of-Pack Food Labels, 26 GRIFFITH L. REV. 355, 359 (2017); Weil et al., supra note 10, at
171. However, recent disclosure scholarship, including on food labeling, highlights the idea that
not all people necessarily want more information in their lives. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1; Lucia
A. Reisch, Cass R. Sunstein, & Micha Kaiser, What Do People Want to Know? Information
Avoidance and Food Policy Implications, 102 FOOD POL’Y, May 5, 2021.
12. See, e.g., Alan R. Kristal et al., Trends in Food Label Associated with New Nutrition
Labeling Regulations, 88 AJPH 1212, 1215 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Alexia Brunet Marks, Taming America’s Sugar Rush: A Traffic-Light Label
Approach, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 683, 714 (2020).
14. See generally MORGAN & YEUNG, supra note 8, at 96; Weil et al., supra note 10, at 155;
Murphy & Sanderson, supra note 11, at 356.
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energy bars are healthy, when in fact they are often packed with sugar. 15 All in
all, food labels play an important role in addressing public health issues,
including diabetes, obesity, heart disease, food poisoning, food allergies,
nutritional preferences (such as gluten-free or lactose-free diets), and general
well-being. 16
Disclosure rules are considered a soft form of regulation, allowing the
regulated entity (e.g., food companies) to operate relatively free from regulation
in a specific area, as long as relevant information is provided to relevant
audiences. 17 From the target-audience point of view, regulation by information
advances individuals’ personal autonomy and reduces the paternalism that is
inherent to traditional command-and-control regulation, which relies on strict
prohibitions and restrictions. 18 For example, governments generally do not limit
the inclusion of sugar in food products, but merely set rules regarding how food
companies should disclose sugar quantities on their packages. 19 Consumers are
free to choose according to their personal preferences, as long as relevant
information is made available by firms. Generally, disclosure is subject to
regulatory supervision and enforcement, and corporations that violate disclosure
rules, including food-labeling regulations, may be subject to legal sanctions. 20
Another goal of mandated disclosure is to deter companies from supplying
products and services that require adverse public disclosures and to softly
motivate companies, without using direct legal commands, to change their
products and services and to create new, more socially responsible products and
services, such as healthier snacks, that do not warrant adverse labeling. 21 In the
food industry context, this process is sometimes referred to as reformulation. 22
B.

Under-Investigated Challenges of Disclosure Regulation

The goal of disclosure regulation in the food industry is not only to make
sure that valuable information is provided to consumers, but also to monitor
companies’ textual statements on packages, such as “healthy,” “just a tad sweet,”

15. See Jayson L. Lusk, Consumer Beliefs about Healthy Foods and Diets, 14 PLOS ONE 10,
2 (2019) (empirically testing public misconceptions of “healthy” foods).
16. See, e.g., Natasha Clarke et al., Impact of Health Warning Labels on Snack Selection: An
Online Experiment, 154 APPETITE 10–12 (2020).
17. See ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY,
AND PRACTICE 119 (2d ed. 2012).
18. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 146–47.
19. See Gyorgy Scrinis & Christine Parker, Front-of-Pack Food Labelling and the Politics of
Nutritional Nudges, 38 L. & POL’Y 234, 236 (2016).
20. See Marks, supra note 13, at 713; Jennifer L. Pomeranz, A Comprehensive Strategy to
Overhaul FDA Authority for Misleading Food Labels, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 617 (2013).
21. See, e.g., Scrinis & Parker, supra note 19, at 236.
22. See Marks, supra note 13, at 696.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

154

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:149

or “all natural,” 23 as well as terms such as “butter” and “meat” when used by
vegan food companies. 24 These types of textual labeling often spark clashes, and
even legal battles, between regulators, regulated food companies, consumers,
and competitors. 25 Litigation in this context usually focuses on the meaning,
interpretation, and implications of the wording used by food companies to
describe their product.
While this is a familiar misinformation challenge in regulating food labels,
there is another, under-investigated, misinformation challenge in this context
that warrants attention: the “misinformation effect of graphic disclosure.” This
term refers to graphic-based disclosure schemes, under which regulatees thwart
regulatory objectives and spread misinformation through “creative compliance”
and visual manipulation.
Generally, creative compliance means that companies comply with the
language of the law but not with its spirit, using various and often sophisticated
methods to bypass the essence of the law. 26 Thus, companies will supply the
required information to the relevant public, for example, by adding mandated
symbols on packages and at the same time will deliberately take steps to
obfuscate and dilute this information and its impact on consumers, for instance,
through packaging redesign.
The misinformation effect of graphic disclosure via food labeling is an
important subject of inquiry for several reasons. First, types of disclosure
manipulation are especially relevant in the food industry, in which disclosure
rules, rather than other regulatory strategies such as command-and-control, play
a key role in common regulatory frameworks. Graphic manipulation of
disclosure rules may frustrate the regulatory goals of food labeling, such as
protecting consumers from food hazards, helping them make informed
nutritional choices, encouraging reformulation of foods, and addressing public
health issues, all while maintaining consumer autonomy. 27 Graphic
manipulations by food companies can not only set back important health
regulation endeavors but also directly infringe on consumer autonomy.
Second, disclosure regulation in food industries around the world is shifting
in recent years from the provision of tables, panels, and text usually on the back
P24F

P25F

P

P

23. See, e.g., David Shimkin, California Consumers and Food Manufacturers Await Key
Government Rules on Food Labeling, FOOD RECALL MONITOR, 2021, https://www.foodrecall
monitor.com/2017/09/01/california-consumers-and-food-manufacturers-await-key-governmentrules-on-food-labeling; Marks, supra note 13, at 683, 690.
24. See Katherine Mckeen, Are Vegan “Butter” and “Meat” Labels Protected as Free
Speech?, REG. REV. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/12/09/mckeen-veganbutter-meat-labels-protected-free-speech.
25. See id.
26. See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance
in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1162–63 (2010).
27. See supra Part I(A).
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of packages, to the addition of front-of-package infographics, 28 based on colorcoding, star ratings, and icons. 29 This experimental regulation is dynamic and
would thus benefit from explorations of case studies in countries that have
already implemented such labeling systems.
Such study may aid regulators who are contemplating adjusting current
labeling systems. Government regulators that have implemented voluntary
front-of-package labeling 30 may be interested in considering a move toward
mandatory labels, while regulators that operate mandatory front-of-package
labeling systems may want to consider a shift towards voluntary approaches.
These and other types of regulatory and legal adjustments warrant careful
consideration and efforts to learn from previous experience. Additionally,
regulators in various countries that have not yet implemented front-of-package
labeling systems, such as the U.S. FDA, are currently considering adopting
them 31 and should be aware of possible pitfalls as well as potential solutions. 32
Third, recent legal scholarship has advocated food-labeling reforms in the
United States that would mandate color-coded front-of-package labels, based,
inter alia, on other countries’ experience with similar labeling schemes, like
tobacco. 33 While the comparison is warranted, it is also imperative to explore
the challenges that have been directly associated with front-of-package food
reforms in other states before taking such steps.
Finally, studying the graphic manipulation of food labels can help develop
the policy and theory of graphics-based disclosure regulation in general, which
is becoming widespread in various areas of regulation, as well as creative
compliance theory, which is prevalent in regulator-regulatee relationships in
various fields.
The next Part will discuss the Israeli 2020 food-labeling reform, which
introduced new mandatory front-of-package traffic-light symbols, and will
examine the ways in which the food industry has actively tried to frustrate it.

28. See Murphy & Sanderson, supra note 11, at 359.
29. See id. at 358.
30. See, e.g., Chantal Julia & Serge Hercberg, Big Food’s Opposition to the French NutriScore Front-of-Pack Labeling Warrants a Global Reaction, 108 AJPH 318 (2018); Shmuel I.
Becher et al., Hungry for Change: The Law and Policy of Food Health Labeling, 54 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1305 (2019). See generally Report to the European Parliament and the Council Regarding
the Use of Additional Forms of Expression and Presentation of the Nutrition Declaration, COM
(2020) 207 final (May 20, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/labellingnutrition_fop-report-2020-207_en.pdf.
31. See Marks, supra note 13, at 717; Nutrient Warning Labels, OBESITY EVIDENCE HUB (last
updated Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.obesityevidencehub.org.au/collections/prevention/nutrientwarning-labels.
32. These will be discussed infra Part III.
33. See Marks, supra note 13; see also Camille Currey, Despite What You’ve Been Told—
Unwrapping the Falsities Surrounding Food Labels, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1279, 1308 (2016).
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II. CREATIVE COMPLIANCE WITH DISCLOSURE RULES: THE ISRAELI FOODLABELING REFORM
A.

The Israeli Food-Labeling Reform

Without doubt, one of the most notable recent consumer reforms in Israel is
the 2020 food-labeling reform. 34 The roots of this reform lie in a set of
recommendations issued by the Ministry of Health’s Healthy Nutrition
Regulation Commission, which was formed in 2016 to “examine various
measures that can influence the dietary habits of the population on the one hand,
and bring about a change in food composition on the other.” 35 The Committee
operated as part of a multi-tiered national program to promote healthy eating in
Israel, 36 focusing on malnutrition problems and their impact on individuals as
well as on society as a whole. 37 This national health program was launched in
light of gloomy scientific predictions about obesity and related disease in Israel,
as well as international studies on the prevention of such ailments. 38
The highlight of these recommendations (and of the reform itself) was the
imposition of “informative and evaluative labeling” obligations on food
manufacturers and importers, entailing the inclusion of front-of-package red
warning symbols on food products containing high concentrations of sugar,
saturated fat, and sodium. 39 In addition to these warning symbols, the Ministry
of Health would also allow manufacturers and importers to print a positive green
symbol on products that meet the Ministry’s nutritional recommendations. 40

34. See generally ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE RED LABELS: HARMFUL FOOD LABELING,
https://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/FoodAndNutrition/Nutrition/Adequate_nutrition/Pages/
FoodLabeling.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2021) [hereinafter THE RED LABELS].
35. ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NUTRITION DIV. OF THE PUB. HEALTH SERV., REPORT OF THE
HEALTHY NUTRITION REGULATION COMMITTEE 9 (2016) (Hebrew) [hereinafter REGULATION
COMMITTEE REPORT], https://www.health.gov.il/publicationsfiles/healthydietcommittee_recom
mendation.pdf. See also Ronit Endevelt et al., Regulatory Measures to Improve Nutrition Policy
Towards a Better Food Environment for Prevention of Obesity and Associated Morbidity in Israel,
3 PUB. HEALTH PANORAMA 566 (2017).
36. See ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, HEALTHY ISRAEL 2020, https://www.health.gov.il/
English/Topics/HealthyIsrael/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2021). The approach also
includes, e.g., encouraging reformulation, regulating food advertising for youngsters, promoting
nutritional education, and financial support for small businesses to manufacture healthy foods. See
REGULATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 37.
37. See REGULATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 68.
38. See id. at 1.
39. See THE RED LABELS, supra note 34.
40. See ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, CONDITIONS FOR LABELING FOODS WITH GREEN CHECK
MARK (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/news/24112019_2.
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Previously, mandatory disclosure rules focused on standard back-of-package
nutritional panels. 41
The Committee’s recommendations were based on the idea that the design
of the food choice environment for Israeli citizens is the responsibility of the
state. 42 The Committee’s report states that the purpose of this “traffic light”
system would be to encourage citizens to consume fresh, natural, and homemade
foods; reduce consumption of foods high in calories, saturated fat, sugar, and
sodium; encourage consumers to check foods at the time of purchase and use the
new markings to make informed purchasing choices; and develop a public
preference for foods that carry as few warning signs as possible, especially for
foods without any negative markings. 43
The recommendations were also intended to support reformulation—a shift
among food companies toward food products that meet the new standards and
so require few, if any, warning signs. 44 The idea is that food companies will
begin to phase out products requiring a red label, such as high-sugar yogurts and
cereals, and instead will develop new products that do not have to be red-labeled
at all, such as low-sugar yogurts and cereals. 45
The Committee’s report explained that it recommended this front-ofpackage traffic-light marking system because it is easy to apply and easy to
understand, making it relatively simple for the public to select healthier
products. 46 Using graphic markings can also help youngsters, seniors, and
consumers who are not proficient in Hebrew to navigate the supermarket aisles
and the abundance of foods more easily. 47 The Committee members also pointed
out in their report that the public seeks and expects to receive information and
recommendations from the Ministry of Health—the professional regulator
responsible for the issue—regarding the products it consumes. 48

41. See ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, FOOD LABEL AND NUTRITIONAL LABELING,
https://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/FoodAndNutrition/Nutrition/Adequate_nutrition/Pages/
labeling.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2021).
42. REGULATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 1.
43. See id. at 42.
44. See id. at 43. See also Michal Gillon-Keren et al., Development of Criteria for a Positive
Front-of-Package Food Labeling: The Israeli Case, 12 NUTRIENTS 1875 (2020).
45. See Flora Southey, Israel: “New Opportunities” for Reformulation as Gov’t Imposes
HFSS Warnings Front-of-Pack, FOOD NAVIGATOR (Jan. 27, 2020, 4:24 PM), https://www.food
navigator.com/Article/2020/01/27/Israel-introduces-mandatory-HFSS-warnings-front-of-pack.
46. See REGULATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 43.
47. See ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE RED MARKINGS REACH THE SHELVES,
https://www.efsharibari.gov.il/eat-healthy/buy-healthy-food/food-labeling/harmful-food-labeling
(last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
48. See REGULATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 43. See also Shosh Shahrabani,
The Impact of Israel’s Front-of-Package Labeling Reform on Consumers’ Behavior and Intentions
to Change Dietary Habits, 10 ISR. J. HEALTH POL’Y RES. 44 (2021).
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In accordance with the Committee’s recommendations, The Protection of
Public Health (Food) (Nutritional Labeling) Regulations (2017) were enacted, 49
with the stated purpose of making information about the nutritional value of prepackaged food accessible to consumers, in the form of symbols. 50 A cost-benefit
report conducted by the Ministry estimated that the reform would prevent the
death of some 2,000 people per year and save some $185 million in publichealth-system costs. 51
The food-labeling regulations require manufacturers and importers of prepackaged food products to mark on the front of the package those products
whose sodium, sugar, or saturated fat values exceed the regulatory standards. 52
For example, foods containing more than ten percent sugar, four percent
saturated fat, or 400 milligrams of salt per 100 grams of solid food should be
marked with red symbols. 53
These symbols (see Figure 1 below) appear in the first appendix to the
regulations, and they state that the product contains “sugar in high quantity,”
next to an illustration of a teaspoon of sugar; “sodium in high quantity,” next to
an illustration of a saltshaker; and “saturated fat in high quantity,” alongside an
illustration of butter.

49. The Protection of Public Health (Food) (Nutritional Labeling) Regulations, 5778–2017
(Isr.), https://www.health.gov.il/Subjects/FoodAndNutrition/Nutrition/Adequate_nutrition/Docu
ments/THE%20PROTECTION%20OF%20PUBLIC%20HEALTH%20%28FOOD%29%20%28
NUTRITIONAL%20LABELING%29%20REGULATIONS%2c%205778%20-%202017.pdf
[hereinafter Nutritional Labeling Regulations].
50. Id. at § 1.
51. ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF UNHEALTHY FOOD CONSUMPTION
AND OBESITY AND THE EXPECTED BENEFIT FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FOOD LABELING
REGULATIONS (July 25, 2017), https://www.health.gov.il/NewsAndEvents/SpokemanMesseges/
Pages/25072017_2.aspx.
52. Nutritional Labeling Regulations, supra note 49, at § 5.
53. Id. at § 9.
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FIGURE 1. THE NEW ISRAELI FOOD SYMBOLS

As noted above, along with the obligation to mark harmful foods with red
markings, manufacturers, farmers, marketers, and importers are also allowed to
voluntarily mark foods that meet Ministry standards for nutritional content with
a green symbol. 54 As shown in Figure 1 above, this is a round symbol with the
caption “The Green Label.” 55 According to regulatory guidelines, foods that
must be marked in red cannot also bear a green label. 56
Generally, each symbol should appear only once on a single package (there
is no requirement for two sugar warnings for products that contain twenty
percent sugar, for example). The graphic design of all symbols, including their
dimensions, formation, and order of appearance, are specified in Ministry
regulations and guidelines in great detail. 57

54. See ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE GREEN LABEL – LABELING OF HARMLESS FOOD,
https://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/FoodAndNutrition/Nutrition/Adequate_nutrition/Pages/
green-labeling.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2021).
55. See id.
56. See ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, REQUISITES FOR GREEN LABELING, https://www.health
.gov.il/subjects/foodandnutrition/nutrition/documents/green-label.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
57. See Nutritional Labeling Regulations, supra note 49; ISR. MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
NUTRITION DIV., GUIDELINES OF GREEN LABELING (2020), https://www.health.gov.il/subjects/
foodandnutrition/nutrition/documents/green-label-inst.pdf.
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B.

Misinformation & Creative Compliance in the Israeli Food Industry 58

The Israeli labeling reform came into force after a long transition period of
two years from the initial publication of the regulations,59 instituted in response
to pleas from companies. While manufacturers and marketers met the timelines
and requirements for including the markings on products in accordance with
guidelines and regulations, the manner in which they complied appears to be
entirely against the spirit of the reform. Sadly, it seems that the food industry
has employed various graphic-based misinformation tactics to circumvent the
reform. 60
Most prominently, many food companies redesigned their food packaging
in a way that made it difficult to identify the new regulatory labels. 61
Additionally, many new products that have entered the market since the reform
began have been designed in a way that camouflages the new regulatory labels. 62
For example, the packaging of many food products has been changed to red,
making it difficult to spot the new regulatory red markings. 63 Other packages
were redesigned in red and green to create a similar effect. 64 In addition, round
design elements, such as red strawberries, cherry tomatoes, and other red
elements have been added or moved by food companies to be placed near the
regulatory red markings and thus decrease their prominence. 65
Circles in blue, green, and black containing texts such as “favorite and
familiar taste,” “with oatmeal,” and “25% protein” were placed by food
companies next to the regulatory symbols, making it difficult for consumers to
distinguish between regulatory and non-regulatory symbols and to easily spot
the new regulatory markings. 66 In a similar vein, food companies also added
round green labels that are graphically very similar to the green regulatory label,
stating, e.g., “natural ingredients only,” “contains sugar from fruit only,” and
“for frying, cooking, and baking.” 67
P59F

P

P60F

58. This subpart is based on Israeli media coverage as well as this author’s own findings and
observations in local supermarkets since the reform commenced in January 2020. Dozens of
pictures of relevant food packages are on file with the author.
59. Nutritional Labeling Regulations, supra note 49, at § 18.
60. See Nurit Kadosh, Too Much Sugar? St. Dalfour Invented its Own Green Sign: “Contains
Only Sugar From the Fruit”, CALCALIST (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.ynet.co.il/economy/article/
H1lJzVzE8; Michal Raz-Haimowitz, This is how health labeling disappears: the tricks of food
companies to reduce product labeling reform, GLOBES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.globes.co.il/
news/article.aspx?did=1001314991.
61. See Kadosh, supra note 60; see Raz-Haimowitz, supra note 60.
62. See supra note 58.
63. See id.; Raz-Haimowitz, supra note 60.
64. See supra note 58.
65. See Raz-Haimowitz, supra note 60.
66. See supra note 58.
67. See supra note 58; Kadosh, supra note 60.
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In itself, this plurality of front-of-package symbols also creates confusion
and erodes the regulatory message inherent in the new markings.
Figure 2 below presents several examples of what appears to be graphic
manipulations of the new food labels. The pictures show food packages with
green markings that are very similar in design to the regulatory green label, and
yet all of which are non-regulatory; red packages that camouflage red regulatory
warning labels; cherry tomatoes and other round red objects that were placed or
moved next to the red warning symbols; and packages that use red and green as
their main background color—the same colors used in the new regulatory
labeling system. 68
FIGURE 2. EXAMPLES OF ISRAELI FOOD PACKAGES AFTER THE LABELING
REFORM

While formal legal disputes have not yet emerged, walking down the aisle
of a typical Israeli supermarket reveals a widespread practice of graphic
manipulation by food companies. 69 Yet, companies that were asked about this
68. See supra note 58.
69. See id.
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practice by the press have completely denied engaging in such manipulation. 70
In some cases, in response to media coverage, the Ministry has declared that
companies’ labeling is misleading, but the companies themselves have rejected
this assertion. 71 In any case, this practice would seem to represent a significant
loss for consumers, regulators, and the food industry in general and is an
unwanted phenomenon that warrants attention.
C. Interim Conclusions
The case study presented above shows that front-of-package food-labeling
reforms can be subject to misinformation via graphic manipulation of packaging
by firms. Three, more general, conclusions can also be drawn from the case
study, regarding disclosure-based regulation and creative compliance:
1. Graphic disclosure rules can be subject to misinformation effects, via
graphic manipulations by regulatees.
2. While disclosure rules are generally regarded as soft regulation, in that
they do not dictate output quality, quantity, or prices but merely regulate
the provision of information, they still do not guarantee industry
compliance and may suffer from similar creative compliance ailments as
command-and-control regulation.
3. Misinformation via creative compliance tactics can occur not only in
mandatory disclosure settings but also in hybrid regulatory schemes of
disclosure, and with regards to both the mandatory and voluntary
components of such schemes.
A more detailed discussion of these conclusions falls outside the scope of
this Article, and they warrant further, separate research.
The next Part discusses what can be done to mitigate the creative compliance
problems of disclosure-based regulation, such as those presented in the case
study. The suggested framework is also applicable to the Israeli arena and can
potentially correct the misinformation effect of recent food labeling strategies
post-reform.
III. MITIGATING CREATIVE COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS IN DISCLOSURE SCHEMES
Legally, the Israeli case of misinformation through graphic manipulation of
food labels ultimately depends on the interpretation of such terms as
“noticeable” (labeling) and “deceiving” (labeling), as the relevant regulations 72
did not account for this specific type of misinformation. This is often the case
with creative compliance. Creative compliance tactics typically exploit legal

70. See Kadosh, supra note 60; Raz-Haimowitz, supra note 60.
71. See Kadosh, supra note 60.
72. See Nutritional Labeling Regulations, supra note 49.
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loopholes or grey areas in a manner that is not a violation of the law per se, but
neither can it be regarded as full compliance with the law. 73
Creative compliance tactics—sometimes referred to in legal scholarship as
technical or minimal compliance 74—can be subject to litigation in appropriate
cases. But litigation is not always the answer, and in fact, it can be
counterproductive. For example, though the Ministry of Health could launch
legal proceedings against food companies that have graphically manipulated
disclosure, such litigation would be prolonged and costly, its outcome uncertain,
and its deterrent effects unclear. These concerns are particularly acute since the
food companies engaging in graphic manipulation include major monopolies
that are well equipped to fight and survive prolonged legal battles. 75 Also, from
an ex-ante point of view, it is generally better to encourage compliance before
implementing new regulation than to enforce it through administrative
sanctioning and in the courts. 76
Legislation is also often futile. It is a known phenomenon in regulatory
relationships that regulators play cat-and-mouse with regulatees. 77 In the context
of creative compliance, regulators typically attempt to fill legal gaps via the
enactment of legal amendments, even as regulatees often think of new ways to
bypass regulation. 78 The Israeli case demonstrates that even the most specific
labeling regulations covering issues of size, color, form, and location of
symbols 79 cannot anticipate all possible strategies to circumvent full
compliance. Formal legal tactics, such as enforcement through litigation or
regulatory legislation including legislative amendments, are therefore not
necessarily the answer to creative compliance. 80
The author suggests accompanying new disclosure schemes with a carrotand-stick approach, based on two other soft regulatory tools: “regulatory
shaming” and “regulatory contracts.” The power of these tactics is that they shift
the regulatory relationship from the administrative legal sphere into the public,
social, and commercial spheres, which can be more effective in achieving
regulatory goals. These tools supplement hard law with soft law, and replace
concepts such as formal legislation, enforcement, inspection, and compliance

73. See Hickman & Hill, supra note 26, at 1162–63.
74. See id. at 1162.
75. See supra Part II.
76. At the same time, there can be advantages to command-and-control enforcement,
including deterrent effects and boosts to the public image of regulatory agencies (assuming victory
in court for the regulatory agency).
77. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611, 611
(2011).
78. See id. at 614.
79. See Nutritional Labeling Regulations, supra note 49; see also supra Part I(A).
80. See Buell, supra note 77, at 614–16.
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with ideas of trust, reputation, long-term relationships, consensus-building, and
social responsibility.
“Regulatory shaming” refers to the publication by government agencies of
negative information concerning regulated private bodies—mostly corporations,
industries, businesses, organizations, and factories—in order to further publicinterest goals, such as occupational safety, consumer protection, and
environmental protection. 81
“Regulatory contracts” refers to regulator-regulatee agreements regarding
the terms of regulation. 82 Typically, the regulator and the regulatee undertake
voluntary commitments, which may include, for instance, compliance
assurances from the regulated entity in exchange for regulatory leniency in
rulemaking, inspection, or enforcement. 83 Regulatory leniency may include
postponing the commencement of a new reform, promising regulatory stability
(not changing the regulatory framework for a certain period), and gradual
enforcement. 84 Such regulatory agreements are based on dialogue, trust,
consensus, and cooperation. 85
Regulators should consider accompanying new (and current) disclosure
schemes with regulatory agreements (preferably industry-wide), in which
companies undertake to comply fully with regulation and to maintain open
dialogue with the regulator, based on trust and cooperation regarding issues of
compliance (the carrot approach). As part of such agreements, companies should
also state that they acknowledge the importance of the new regulation and are
committed to achieving its public goals based on their social responsibilities.
In exchange, regulators could offer regulatees leniency and adjustments
regarding regulatory reforms—for example, in terms of the scope and level of
obligations imposed, enforcement and inspection policies, date of
commencement, and setting future timelines for reexamining the reform or,
alternatively, assuring regulatory stability.
Agreements should be made public by regulators as part of their efforts to
publicize such new reforms. While regulatees tend to comply with consensusbased regulation more than with command-and-control regulation, 86 this added
publicity dimension should operate as an additional safeguard against regulatory
violations and creative compliance.

81. See Sharon Yadin, Regulatory Shaming, 49 LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL. L. 407, 419–20
(2019).
82. See Sharon Yadin, E-Regulation, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 101, 129–30 (2020).
83. See id.
84. See Sharon Yadin, Israel’s Law and Regulation After the Gas Discoveries, in
REGULATION IN ISRAEL: VALUES, EFFECTIVENESS, METHODS 217, 223 (Eyal Tevet et al. eds.,
2021).
85. See Yadin, supra note 82, at 130.
86. Id. at 130–31.
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In a similar vein, regulatory agreements on disclosure reforms should also
be accompanied by “regulatory shaming” (the stick approach), in which
regulators “name and shame” those companies that engage in creative
compliance—thus violating not only the regulations but also the regulatory
agreements they signed—and also publicly identify and praise those firms that
excel in compliance. For example, in the food industry, regulators can publish a
list of the best and worst companies in terms of compliance with labeling
regulations. Top-rated firms should demonstrate not only full compliance with
regulations but also beyond-compliance practices, such as green labeling and
reformulation, which are often voluntary. 87
Regulatory shaming and praising tactics will give companies a new kind of
motivation to comply in full with new and existing regulatory reforms and to
refrain from creative compliance tactics. If regulatory agencies do not have
sufficient existing powers to “name and shame,” companies can be required to
give their prior consent to “regulatory shaming” under the terms of the
regulatory agreements. Alternatively, shaming powers can be legislated as part
of the new disclosure reforms or after the fact.
Regulatory shaming is especially well suited to disclosure-based regulatory
schemes, which are often consumer-oriented, because consumers can operate as
effective shaming agents vis-à-vis misbehaving firms. 88 Graphic manipulation
of visual labels that are meant to aid consumers in making healthier choices is
especially appropriate for such a “shaming” approach because of the strong
effect this approach can have on consumers. 89 Corporate attempts to deceive
consumers via subconscious manipulation (for example, by using misleading
colors and artwork) can elicit strong reactions from individuals and consumer
organizations with significant implications for companies’ bottom line.
Regulatory shaming may also invoke effective responses from other
stakeholders, such as creditors, investors, competitors, suppliers, stockholders,
management, and the media.
CONCLUSION
This Article discussed the misinformation effect of graphic disclosure rules,
in which companies thwart regulatory objectives through graphic manipulation
of regulatory labels, symbols, and other visual information-based tools.
Harnessing lessons from the recent Israeli food-labeling reform, the Article has
shown that front-of-package food labels, which are becoming increasingly
widespread in various jurisdictions and are under consideration in the United
States and other countries, can be subject to visual manipulation and
87. See, e.g., the Israeli case study discussed supra Part II(A).
88. See, e.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 666
(2011).
89. See Sharon Yadin, Shaming Big Pharma, 36 JREG BULLETIN 131, 137–38 (2019).
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misinformation as part of corporate creative compliance. Especially in the age
of Covid-19, companies should be held accountable for any attempt to
manipulate citizens in matters of public health. The Article therefore suggests a
combination of a stick-and-carrot approach, including both regulatory shaming
and regulatory agreements, to alleviate some of the compliance problems
discussed.

